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Article 1: Turmoil in China is wishful thinking 
Editorial, Global Times 
February 25 2011
In the wake of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, popular protests have swept the Arab world. 
Some lost no time in hyping that the wave would make its way to China. Nevertheless, such a 
misjudgment would only lead to disappointment.
A few Western media outlets are seeking hints of a Chinese-style "Jasmine Revolution." With a 
colossal population, China inevitably has a few dissidents, who are energized by the public revolts 
in the Middle East and call for protests or even a revolution in China. Such people do exist, 
especially in larger cities.
Recently, a number of Western journalists gathered at an appointed place, watching a performance 
art version of the "Jasmine Revolution" given by several Chinese. The number of journalists and 
bystanders there overwhelmed that of the performers. However, some overseas media outlets 
reported this as a massive popular movement, and barely veiled their expectations for turmoil in 
China.
Their reports essentially became stage photography, rather than investigative journalism. Strictly 
speaking, such careless sensationalization was rather news forgery than journalism.
Anyone knowing about the Chinese society would never predict a Chinese-style "Jasmine 
Revolution." This society is now generally stable. This is not merely a reflection of the state of 
society, but a widely held public opinion.
Indeed, China has many problems and conflicts - imbalanced development and a wide poverty gap 
have incurred plenty of complaints. The nation has formed a political determination to address these 
problems, and possible solutions are being considered.
Chinese society has no interest in solving these problems through revolution. Many still vividly 
remember the social upheavals that occurred decades ago. They have more faith in the strengths of 
reform and development.
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China is far more stable than some would think. Thousands of years of history have demonstrated 
the stability of Chinese civilization. The social complexity here has also help created a thorough 
social balance.
Most problems in China are by-products of the nation's growth. China is not a dumpsite full of 
problems - it is more like a wharf where both accom-plishments and problems are laid. As long as 
the nation still keeps the momentum of growth, these disappointments will not become a Gordian 
knot.
Success is the best theory - no wisdom could question success. China is seeing economic and social 
progress now. It has drawn worldwide at-tention during the first decade of the 21st century. No 
matter whether they are applauded or rebuked today, these achievements will turn out to be a great 
success in our history. And history's dustbin is always littered with those who aspire for China's 
collapse.
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Article 2: Reading too much into a jasmine bunch 
Editorial, Global Times 
February 21, 2011
A few people in Beijing, Shanghai and several other Chinese cities attempted to mimic the "Jasmine 
revolution" Sunday, as highlighted by mainstream Western media. These people, however, are like 
beggars in the streets - they never fade away, while the rest of the country moves forward.
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have spread in the Middle East, and some in the West want 
China to become "the next Egypt." This is simply impossible. China is huge and will always contain 
certain problems. But a few people chanting slogans or throwing jasmine flowers in the street will 
not slow the country's momentum.
China's  government  holds  the  support  of  the  majority  of  society.  Some people  do  complain  - 
occasionally because they enjoy the thrill of standing up to authority and showing off their bravado 
- but Chinese society as a whole cannot be represented by these agitated few. There is no collective 
will for revolution in China.
After more than 30 years of reform and opening-up, Chinese society has developed a strong forward 
momentum,  working  tirelessly  to  solve  and  curtail  its  problems.  The  government  has  been 
fomenting this momentum and won plaudits from the public for doing so. Most believe that through 
normal channels, many problems in China will be incrementally solved, and that gradual reform is 
the most  economical path to social  progress.  The country understands that  a revolution can be 
destructive.
The reality in China now is that extreme thoughts and behavior will always endure, as per Sunday,  
when a few people drew attention to them-selves through "performance art." But their push for a 
"revolution" will  falter,  as the public is  opposed to it.  That  authorities  are  taking a strong line 
against these people is supported both by law and public opinion.
Some Western media outlets  have tried to  play up these incidents.  This  is  understandable to  a 
certain extent. At the moment, the social turmoil spreading in the Middle East has held up a mirror 
to political leaders in the US and Europe.
By comparison, China appears unscathed. It would likely spare certain feelings in the West, were 
China to fall to trouble.
Nevertheless, China is in a very unique position. Neither throwing jasmine flowers in Beijing nor 
hyping social disruption in Western media will stir up public interest in overturning social progress.
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Article 3: China is not the Middle East
Editorial, People’s Daily
March 10, 2011
The upheaval in Libya has claimed at least  1,000 lives, according to United Nations estimates. 
Valerie Amos, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, said on March 7 
that one million Libyans are in need of humanitarian assistance. We see on the television news that 
countless Libyan refugees have fled the country, beginning desperate lives of wandering, and not 
knowing when they can return. This causes us to sigh deeply: in the midst of national chaos, it is 
ultimately the ordinary people who suffer hardship. 
Since the end of last year, there have been dramatic fluctuations in many countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and the people have faced major disaster. And just as the world is seeking 
solutions for the Middle East, a number of  people with ulterior motives both inside and outside 
China are conspiring to turn the disaster toward China.  They have used the Internet to fan the 
flames, hoping to whip up “street politics” in China and thereby upset order in China. 
However, China is not the Middle East. 
The hearts and minds of the Chinese people are steady. The people have enough to eat and enjoy 
moderate  prosperity,  and  they are  making small  steps  toward  lives  of  prosperity.  The  Chinese 
people know only too well that the precondition of living a good life is national stability and social 
harmony. Through 60 years of the New China, and 30 years of opening and reform, the nation has 
progressively thrived and prospered,  and its  comprehensive strength has appreciably risen.  The 
people have made real gains. In their hearts now, people are wary of unrest, of rocking the boat. 
They  desire  calm  and  stability,  harmony  and  peace.  They  throw  all  of  their  energies  into 
development and living better  lives.  The vast  majority of people are  steady in their  hearts  and 
minds. Only a small minority want chaos, and they will not have it. 
The rule of the Chinese Communist Party is fundamentally secure. In recent years, China has hosted 
the Olympic Games, the World Expo, the Asian Games, and what joy haven’t the Chinese people 
felt at hosting these events successfully? What heroic emotions the Chinese people feel in knowing 
that we grappled so successfully with the Wenchuan Earthquake, the Yushu [quake] relief effort, 
successive financial crises, and most recently the evacuation [of Chinese] from Libya. The whole 
world  have  marveled  at  how  a  poor  and  weak  nation  has  become  the  world’s  second-largest 
economy. All of this came from the leaders of what party? The Chinese Communist Party. Last year, 
a survey conducted in 22 countries showed that the vast majority of people are unsatisfied with the 
direction their countries are heading, but China was the exception. The survey said: “Only in China 
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did the majority (87%) of residents express satisfaction with the situation in their countries.” . . . 
China  long  ago  abolished  the  system  of  life-long  tenure  in  leading  posts,  and  the  orderly 
replacement of leaders is already our practice. China no longer has this situation where leaders rule 
for 20, 30 or 40 years. China has already build a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics 
and it is right now working to perfect its system of socialist democracy. The Chinese people can 
participate  in  and discuss  state  affairs  already within  our  existing  legal  system and democratic 
system — there is no need to achieve our political goals through “street politics.” 
Chinese  leaders  all  along  have  heeded  public  opinion,  using  the  methods  of  reform  and 
development to resolve the issues emerging in the midst of reform and development. For example, 
Chinese  college  students  were  few and far  between  in  the  past,  but  now one in  four  Chinese 
between the ages of 18 and 22 are college students. As college graduates have risen, the problem of 
employment opportunities has emerged. There are high housing prices, inflation, the gap between 
rich and poor  and other  problems.  In the government  work report  under  discussion at  the two 
meetings  [of  the  National  People's  Congress  and  the  Chinese  People's  Political  Consultative 
Congress] there are a whole range of solutions. 
The problems emerging in the midst of development are solved by the methods of development; the 
problems emerging in the midst of reform are resolved by the methods of reform. Development and 
reform alone are the correct way to solve problems. Of course, as old problems are solves, new 
problems emerge that need to be tackled. It is in the solving of problems that a society moves ahead. 
But “street politics” will only result in a shock to society, making things worse. It will only result in  
making a China that is right now steadily developing stop in its tracks, or even move backwards. 
China is not the Middle East, and the schemes to direct the chaos of the Middle East toward China 
are destined to fail.
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Article 4: Conscientiously Preserving Social Harmony and Stability
Editorial, Beijing Daily
March 5, 2011
The annual “Two Meetings” have begun, and National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference delegates have arrived in Beijing from all over the country, their 
plan to work out the national development strategy for the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” period. The 
Beijing capital has become a focus for the whole world. 
Recently,  our  nation’s  society  and  economy have  had  good  development  momentum,  and  the 
beautiful prospect of the great revitalization of the Chinese people is before us. Through the hard 
work of the “Eleventh Five-Year Plan” period, our national economy has leapt into second place in 
the world, and our comprehensive national strength has grown substantially. The people’s lives have 
seen clear improvement, and our international status and influence have experienced a clear rise. 
Like the nation as a whole, our capital’s development has entered a new period in history. The face 
of our city changes by the day, and the people live and work in peace and contentment. But recently 
abnormal phenomena have occurred to which we must remain alert. 
Since  the  end  of  last  year,  a  number  of  countries  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  have 
experience continued tumult, their societies sliding into chaos, the personal safety of their people 
unassured, their lives facing deep difficulties. These upheavals have already created major disaster 
for the people of these countries. What we must take note of is that a number of people with ulterior 
motives (别有用心的人 ) have attempt to direct this chaos toward China. They have used the 
Internet to incite illegal assemblies, seeking to create disturbances and whip up “street politics.” The 
masses  are  fiercely  displeased  with  this,  and  the  performances  of  a  few  can  only  become  a 
clamorous play put on for themselves. Some foreign media have called it “performance art.” These 
few who mistakenly believe that they can manufacture Middle Eastern style stories in China can 
only ultimately fail. 
Through more than 30 years of reform, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and 
the efforts and striving of all of our ethnic peoples, our country’s politics have been stable, our 
economy has  developed,  the  Party’s  beneficial  policies  toward  the people  have lodged in their 
hearts, we have had unity, and all of these receive the wholehearted support of the masses . . . 
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Article 5: This Jasmine is tea 
David Gosset, China Daily European Weekly
March 4, 2011
In post-Maoist China, upheaval would disrupt positive 'Jasmine Tea Transformation' and 
gradual changes
All that is real is rational, explained Hegel in the years following the French Revolution, and 
confidently added that whatever is rational is real. One can discuss the exact role of reason in 
human affairs but there is certainly some degree of rationality in historical events. Like the "color 
revolutions" and their roots in the post-Soviet Union space, "the Jasmine Revolutions" are the 
products of a very specific socio-political environment. Irresponsible leaders, bad governance, a 
profound identity crisis, economic and political frustrations as well as the failures of Western 
policies in the Middle East are some of the elements which explain the radical social movements 
changing the Arab world. In that sense, a "Jasmine Revolution" cannot erupt in the Chinese context.
In fact, Deng Xiaoping's "reform and opening-up" is a continuous socio-political spring with 
Chinese characteristics, and, to continue the floral metaphor, could be described as a "Jasmine Tea 
Transformation". More precisely, this transformation is a managed process of modernization on 
China's own terms and in relation to the Chinese intellectual tradition, and not about a great leap 
toward the unknown.
The Chinese-controlled metamorphosis is not only benefiting one-fifth of mankind but is also an 
engine of economic growth for the global village, a guarantee of geopolitical stability and a source 
of new ideas.
Even if the forces which are reshaping the Arab world and the dynamics which are transforming 
China cannot be more different, some segments of the Western society seem to believe that anti-
government protests could seriously disrupt stability in the People's Republic.
In the world's most populous nation, one can certainly encounter activists who advocate radical 
changes but it is mainstream China which will determine the country's future. According to the 
Washington-based Pew Research Center, 87 percent of the Chinese people were satisfied with their 
country's overall situation in 2010 - the satisfaction rate was 72 percent in 2005. It is frustration and 
despair which took some of the 360 million Arabs to the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Sanaa, Tripoli or 
Amman, but energy, optimism and a sense of cheerfulness characterize the collective Chinese 
mood.
External prestige impacts internal politics. While China is gaining more and more psychological 
"face" as a strategic actor, the Arab world has been regrettably losing status and reputation. With the 
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ability to stage world events in global cities - the Beijing Olympics or the Shanghai World Expo - 
China is a highly respected global player whose position is central to all major transnational issues. 
For decades, the Arab world has been unable to find a solution to the Palestinian question, and it is 
Turkey, not Egypt, which is the re-emerging and stabilizing force in a region once dominated by the 
Ottoman Empire. Two years ago, in The Geopolitics of Emotion, French analyst Dominique Mosi 
associated Western societies, the Arab world and the Far East with, respectively, the sentiments of 
fear, humiliation and hope. Beijing's undeniable re-emergence has generated a sense of pride, and if, 
on the Arab street, a sentiment of humiliation prevails, China is filled with confidence.
"Merit may exist independently of dignity, but no dignity is without a certain merit," observed La 
Rochefoucault in one of his maxims. Domestically, objective socio-economic achievements speak 
in favor of the Chinese government. The world's second largest economy is actively building state-
of-the-art infrastructure linking entire new cities where euphoric consumption is often the norm. 
Some of the world's largest companies have already realized that the "Chinese consumer" is the 
main business story of the coming decade.
If one can point at China's social problems, at the shortcomings of Beijing's bureaucracy, at the risks 
of inflation or economic disparities, one has also to acknowledge that a system which took 400 
million people - more than the entire population of the Arab world - out of poverty, and which put 
China in a position to become in the coming decades the largest economy in the world, has a solid 
foundation.
Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, Beijing has seen four generations of 
leaders, and in 2002 the transition from the third to the fourth generation took place in an orderly 
process. Next year, the transition of power at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China is very likely to be smooth. Wan Gang, China's minister of science and technology, and Chen 
Zhu, the minister of health, are not even members of the Communist Party. Western elites and 
public opinion should pay attention to the fact that the Chinese administration is able to select 
highly competent officials whose sense of responsibility is often remarkable. If corruption is, of 
course, also a Chinese issue, China is neither a corrupt nor a failed State.
Since Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997, Beijing's major orientations have been decided by a collective 
leadership among which a consensus has emerged and which is supported by the vast majority of 
the Chinese citizens: The country needs reforms to perfect the rule of law, to create the conditions 
for sustainable economic growth and to provide better social justice. In other words, China needs 
gradual change but no political disruption or economic discontinuity.
Observers of the gigantic Chinese society should also remember that post-Maoist China can be 
better understood as a reaction against the anarchic and destructive moments of the "cultural 
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revolution" (1966-1976). China wants stability and predictability and it will strongly oppose actions 
which could lead to chaotic uncertainty or vast and violent social movements.
Since the beginning of the year tourists can reflect upon a new presence on Tian'anmen Square: A 
massive statue of Confucius now faces Mao's portrait. Neo-Confucianism in the 21st century is not 
about revolutionary protests but ritualistic order, moderation and harmony. China has embarked on 
a process of renaissance through the reinterpretation of its own tradition.
While Washington and Brussels will be occupied with the Middle East problems, China will 
continue to renew itself and, by doing so, will regain centrality in the world's affairs. Chinese 
jasmine tea does not only exude a delicate perfume but it is also a healthy drink.
The author is director of the Euro-China Center for International and Business Relations at CEIBS, 
Shanghai & Beijing, and founder of the Euro-China Forum.
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Blog 1: @Stonywang blog entries on Twitter from the 25th of February 2011.
Posted on Twitter 25th of February 2011
Translated by China Digital Times
Listen, I want to talk about my tea-drinking experience in the wake of 2/20.
I felt from the start that 2/20 itself was a joke, but that the officials wouldn’t find it funny, so my  
goal when I left home that day was very clear; watch the proceedings from the sidelines, without 
having anything to do with Jasmine.
Because they couldn’t catch any of the secret masterminds, the situation after 2/20 is still brewing. 
This week, a lot of people were taken for tea, including myself. If anyone thinks that I’m preparing 
to stage a performance, here are a couple of pictures.
I  think that  the people who are “missing”,  of whose circumstances nothing is  known and who 
cannot be contacted, have probably been made scapegoats in this in order to appease the higher-ups. 
After all, with such broad involvement and so many participants, they definitely had to produce 
results.
Let me come back to the details of my own tea-drinking. Because my company is based in Xuhui 
District, a pair of uniformed policemen found it immediately and, demanding the staff roster, looked 
through it to find my name; of course, the English one. My boss was a bit nervous, afraid of what 
might happen. As for me and my tweeting, the police were bound to want to take me for tea sooner 
or  later.  It’s  not  that  my political  opinions  are  very unorthodox,  but  the  point  of  investigating 
content is to get you to shut up, so you’re always going to strike a nerve one day.
At first  there were two relatively serious men with very rigid attitudes,  who first  asked me to 
confirm my Twitter ID, and then asked what trouble hotspots I’d been involved in lately, constantly 
twisting my words. I said that since they were unwilling to tell me what sensitive phrase they’d 
come across, I wasn’t going to say either. There are a lot of these hotspots, and I’d been on Twitter 
for years, and posted tens of thousands of tweets: which of these was the issue now? Actually, I was 
laughing to myself that these three characters [ —茉莉花 Jasmine] had them so scared that they 
didn’t dare say them in front of me.
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And then,  twisting,  twisting,  twisting,  winding me  up tighter  and tighter  and tighter,  until  we 
reached stalemate … :S I followed what they were saying exactly: the country needs management, 
and the Internet also needs management  in accordance with the law, so I  personally had to be 
willing to accept a certain degree of scrutiny. Now that you’ve come and found me, I said, I’m 
certain that something I said must have been untrue; if you’ll just point to it specifically, I’ll take 
another look, and if I’ve made a mistake, I’ll admit it, apologise, and delete it, and that’ll be that, 
right?
But throughout this winding, they just wouldn’t say which was the offending phrase. In fact, their 
aim in coming here was quite clear: it was to intimidate me into keeping my mouth shut. From my 
point of view, though, this was a good opportunity for me to observe the police in the aftermath of 
2/20.
As for the tricks through which they tried to talk me around, we’ve all grown familiar with them:  
the foreign website (in this case, Twitter) is a tool of the US government, and I should be careful not 
to be exploited. Even if I had no ill intentions myself, I was being exploited to further those of the 
enemy, and in the end the blame would fall on me; it wasn’t worth it.  In a country this big, if 
everyone stressed their own freedom, that couldn’t help but affect the freedom of others, so we still 
needed managing, or else there’d be chaos.
As for management of the web, it  was entirely legitimate,  they said, including the blocking of 
websites like FLG. They could have me in court within a day, if I’d done something to deserve it; 
they wouldn’t need any further excuse.
This talk deadlocked us for a while, until my boss came in to break it. He gave them a business 
card, and said a few words.
One of the other two told me that everyone has their own point of view, and he wouldn’t try to talk 
me around to his. At the same time, though, he wanted to help me see where the line was drawn. On 
the Internet, you can look, you can listen, you can selectively reproduce things, but you can’t post 
on controlled websites and be exploited.
I understood the point he was making, and felt that things here in Shanghai were relatively relaxed: 
at least I was allowed to look. :S
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After this, my attitude, which had remained consistently the same since the first day I’d tweeted, 
became slightly more cooperative; I wanted them to realise that I’m a positive and motivated young 
man who loves his country,  his people, his life. Perhaps in their  eyes my ideology was a little  
extreme (as if shifting my allegiance towards the Party isn’t extreme!), but overall there’d been a 
major shift in my attitude, and we started to talk about lighter matters.
For example, they suggested that I post on the home-grown Sina Weibo instead, or play games. He 
could even try to help me find a girlfriend, a female police officer who are in their public security 
system. I laughed inwardly: in the end, this was just an attempt to install someone in a position 
where they could reshape my thinking. They were still trying to coax me into their control.
Afterwards, the atmosphere was more relaxed, and I was soon able to work out what was going on. 
The ones who’d come to pick me up this time weren’t from the Domestic Security Department, but 
from the Public Security Bureau; the ones in charge of net security, to be precise. Because this 
assignment had come down from above, there was no guarantee that the DSD would be able to 
come and get me over the same business.
I don’t want to give too much away regarding the identities of these two policemen. Some technical 
details are discussed below.
How did they find me? They said they’d tracked me through my company’s IP address, but there’s a 
problem with that: all the 2/20-related tweets I’d sent, without exception, had been from home, not 
from work. At work, obviously, I used firewall circumvention techniques to tweet, but I hadn’t used 
one of the more popular pieces of circumvention software, so there was no chance that I’d been 
caught in a honeypot).
All I can say is that finding me online would be relatively easy: by comparing certain overlapping 
pieces of information, you could quickly get a fix on the company, and even a particular person, and 
then go asking after a guy with an English name. If that’s what they’d done, although it does makes 
sense,  the  net  monitors  shouldn’t  have  enough  time  on  their  hands  to  go  about  this  kind  of 
comparison.
What gave the company trouble afterwards is that, on the basis of this incident, they were ordered to 
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give everyone in the company a fixed IP address, and install inspection and control equipment at the 
gateway to our network.
When they were taking notes, they asked how I’d been circumventing the firewall, and I said I’d 
used a VPN. One of them asked, wasn’t I afraid that they’d set up a honeypot? I said no, I wasn’t: I  
wasn’t doing anything bad, so if they provided a convenient way to get over the wall, I’d use it.
@GoogolMo Happy Birthday!
To summarise the above: at least in Shanghai, you can use Twitter, circumvent the Great Firewall,  
post everyday complaints,  read other peoples’ news, and selectively repost it;  but you may not 
express  political  opinions,  and should avoid grumbling at  sensitive times.  Sometimes,  cultivate 
other interests: chase girls, go on Sina Weibo, immerse yourself in games. That’s what they were 
hoping I’d do.
Since last week, a lot of noobs have appeared [literally “egg heads”, because of the default avatar 
on Twitter, an egg icon], obviously as part of a reinforcement of monitoring on Twitter, through 
which they were able to track me down on Tuesday afternoon. Digging through my new followers 
on Monday, I’d already found at least one possible monitor account. But my tweets are public, and 
one of my explanatory posts had been widely retweeted, so it was hard to avoid being spotted.
That’s all the interesting stuff. Whether you can use any of it to protect yourselves, you can judge 
for yourself. I’ve waited till today to tell it out of consideration for the face of those two police 
officers. They know that what they were doing shouldn’t be made public, so I kept quiet for 48 
hours. As we got along well while we were talking, I’ve published the highlights of our chat, but 
protected their specific identities to they won’t suffer criticism if their supervisors see this.
The remaining tweets are aimed at the 50 Centers and net security police. To get on Twitter, you 
have to circumvent the GFW, which isn’t easy. Monitoring it requires considerable manpower, and 
the work is very laborious. We both know perfectly well whether or not Twitter is controlled by the 
US government, and I’ve been exploited. So your thinking is just very old-fashioned, and gives me 
a real intellectual superiority complex. Sorry about that.
Ultimately, how was I exploited? As I said to a 50 Center on Monday, now you think I’ve been  
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exploited, you come along to exploit me as well. I don’t mind being exploited by both sides; it 
upgrades me from an everyday joe to a double agent. It’s more Hollywood than Hollywood! I’m 
keen to be “exploited”.
I knew that this content I’d posted would be seen by the net supervisors, and that there’d probably 
be some who’d want to find me to drink tea. To tell the truth, I didn’t really mind chatting to you, 
having a good heart-to-heart even to the point of making friends, so next time there’s no need to be 
mean: you call it “tea drinking”, but you didn’t offer me any. PS: I really hate plain-clothes police.  
If DSD dressed in plain clothes come and find me, I can’t stay polite, and treat them like any other  
thugs.
Generally, whether you’re a 50 Center newbie, DSD or net security, your whole thinking and bag of 
tricks  is  dated,  a  generation  behind.  Most  people  on  Twitter  are  relatively thoughtful,  so your 
unwavering dogmatism can’t achieve the desired result, and when you talk to me in a deceitful and 
uncivilised way, I can’t be bothered to retort.
In this respect, you really need to look at your supposed enemy — the US government has learned 
well how to use the internet to propagate its value system, and it’s not by means of the irrelevant 
sophistry of Foreign Ministry spokespeople who talk and talk without saying anything, with the 
media falling over themselves to praise the embarrassing show the next day.
On the whole, I welcome you all to contact me about this, unless it’s to tell me to shut up.
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Blog 2: Goodbye, tyranny! 
Yang Hengjun
Posted on 2011-10-21 on China Media Project
When I wrote “Goodbye, Gadhafi” two months ago, some web users accused me of jumping the 
gun. They said Gadhafi might stage a comeback. But in fact I wasn’t jumping the gun at all. 
One-hundred years ago, perhaps 90 percent of nations on earth were ruled by despots who relied on 
military might. Fifty years ago, such countries represented less than 50 percent of the total. And 
today, less than 10 percent of nations in the world are under autocratic rule. 
I would argue that against this historical tide, one could write a “goodbye” essay about any despot 
and then sit around waiting for their undoing. The people won’t keep you waiting long, and history 
won’t disappoint you.
When I saw pictures online of Gadhafi’s bloodied face [during his capture], something he said not 
long ago echoed in my ears. He said with total confidence during a recent interview with a Western 
journalist: “Will I step down? Who will overthrow me? The people of Libya love me . . . ”
It was these very same people whose love he claimed to possess that drove him to such a piteous 
state, and who took to the streets to celebrate his defeat.
In civilized societies there is an unwritten rule that even when the most ruthless killer is put to death 
under the law, none celebrate it, because human life is valued above all else — and we are all of us 
born innocent babes. 
Right now, this rule does not apply to Libya. It is not suited to the Libyan people, who have just 
freed themselves from a brutal dictatorship. Anyone in the world can understand them, how the 
death of a despot is cause for celebration for a free and peace-loving people. Once the world has 
been rid of all of its despots, humanity will no longer hail the death of any one person, and the 
world will be more civilized for it.
Some  people  — and  Chinese  in  particular  — cannot  understand  the  hostility  others  have  for 
despots, and they don’t understand the difference between democracy and autocracy. On this issue, 
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please allow me to offer the following three points:
1.  The  hostility  people  feel  toward  despots  does  not  necessarily  have  anything  to  do  with 
democracy. Many people taking to the streets do not know what the benefits of democracy are. 
They know only that despotism is no longer tolerable. 
The history of the overthrowing of dictators over the past century has shown us that this does not 
happen  because  the  people  hanker  after  some  fantasy  of  democracy  and  therefore  rise  up  to 
overthrow autocratic rulers. This is an important factor for intellectuals in a number of countries. 
It’s not that they aren’t aware of the hateful nature of autocracy; it’s just that they can’t see the 
democratic future clearly and therefore are willing to do a dance with dictatorship. In order to sleep 
soundly at night, they dupe themselves into believing that “servility” is “reason”.
2.  Overthrowing dictatorship  does  not  equal  the  establishment  of  democracy.  Many half-baked 
scholars are inclined to use the chaos of democracies to argue that overthrowing dictatorship is “not 
worth it” or that “the time is not right.” They fail to see clearly the trends of history,  and they 
underestimate the power of human conscience. Perhaps democracy is far off in the distance, but if 
tyranny is not thrown down it will be farther away still. Autocratic rule is the worst of systems in  
the world. Only by casting it down can people come to grips with other choices and forge a future 
for their country.
Of course,  we must recognize that owing to various historical,  cultural  or religious factors,  the 
overthrow of one form of tyranny may lead to its replacement by another. 
Looking at the Middle East, we can see the Western democratic systems have had little success in 
the  region.  Turkey,  the  country  recognized  in  the  region  as  the  most  democratic,  has  many 
outstanding issues that need solving. 
In this sense, Asian countries influenced by Confucianism are more suited to democratic systems. 
Japan’s democratic system has already in some ways surpassed that of some Western countries, and 
South Korea’s democratic system is undergoing constant improvement. Especially worthy of note is 
Chinese Taiwan, whose democratic system has been operating for not quite 20 years but can already 
serve as an example not just to Asia but to the rest of the world. A number of countries have made 
rapid progress on the democratic front, enough to make the United States, whose democratic system 
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has a 230-year history, blush with shame. 
3. While perhaps all autocratic regimes collapse suddenly, democratic systems cannot be built in a 
day. As tyranny goes against human nature and public feeling, regardless of how splendid things 
seem on  the  surface,  no  matter  how  much  rulers  whitewash  reality  and  employ  machines  of 
propaganda to inspire a glorious image of public loyalty and love, it  will all unavoidably come 
crashing down, and this will happen faster than anyone can expect it. 
This is why everyone knows we will ultimately say “goodbye” to autocratic regimes. We may not 
know exactly when they will come to an end, but they most certainly will. 
However, for all sorts of reasons, not least the damage inflicted on a country by its autocratic rulers, 
once a regime falls the autocratic impulse can persist for generations, and the project of democracy 
will come upon all sorts of difficulties and obstacles. 
Even though this is true those who grumble that democracy is no better than autocracy should open 
their eyes and look again — no person in those more than 100 nations of the world that have won 
the right to free choice would choose to return to the autocratic systems of the past. And there are  
peoples who have not yet set off on the road to democracy who still choose to spill their own blood 
and lay down their lives [in the hope of throwing off tyranny]. 
The vicissitudes of the past century have taught us that while it may be a simpler matter to send 
tyrants to their grave, it is much harder to build democratic systems. If the “Jasmine Revolution” in 
the Middle East is about people yearning for democracy and overthrowing tyranny, then the Wall 
Street protests are about the hope that democratic systems can be improved. Democratic systems 
have the capacity and the space for self-improvement. 
If the autocratic rulers of the world do not loosen their grip on power, they will find themselves  
without choices — like Nicolae Ceauşescu, Saddam Hussein and Gadhafi before them.
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Blog 3: Blog entry by Zhang Wen on Egypt, and the state of democracy in China.
Zhang Wen
Translated by China Elections Blog.
February 9, 2011
'The biggest fear among those who hold power is losing that power. The fear is the same in modern 
times and in ancient, and it is the same among both democratic and autocratic regimes. All power 
wielders will use whatever means at their disposal to squelch opposition and protect themselves. 
The only difference is that in democratic systems, the ability to seize power depends on elections,  
whereas in autocracies, it depends on the military and police apparatuses.
I have seen people affirming support for Mubarak’s [call for] “compromise.” Naturally, this is the 
right choice. What politicians need to understand is the appropriate moment for compromise. At this 
moment, other than “compromise,” Mubarak has no other cards to play, because the military upon 
which his power relies has declared itself neutral and will not fire upon the people.
…
Mubarak has already stated that he wants to expand democracy [in Egypt] and that he also wants to 
make sure that this democratic remedy is suitable for the Egyptian digestion and is not too hasty. 
This type of statement is, of course, “true,” [but at the same time] proves extremely confusing, as 
this is often the type of excuse rulers offer in order to delay a transfer of power.  People’s ability to  
adapt to democracy must be tested through democratic practices, and cannot remain the decision of 
the any one person—certainly not that of the ruler.
For example, in China, those peasants who are “low-quality” and “most unsuited to carrying out 
democratic  procedures”  were  the  first  to  experiment  with  democratic  elections  through  direct 
elections of village heads. After 20 years of these direct elections, the cool breeze of democracy still  
blows only in China’s rural areas, not in the urban areas most suited for democracy. Even now, there 
are still people who will claim that the low quality of Chinese people is not suited for democracy, 
echoing faint words that a Chinese democracy would bring about chaos.
Democracy is  a  good thing—this  isn’t  even any longer  a  matter  of  debate,  as  the  majority of 
Chinese people have already reached a consensus. But how to implement this good thing in China, 
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and to what extent to implement it remain questions that still need to be resolved. Judging from the 
statements  of  the  ruling  authorities,  one  could  conclude  that  China  is  not  fully  ideologically 
prepared for democracy. This can be seen from the organized public criticism of the concept of 
“universal values.”
The  only reason  for  this  unpreparedness  is  that  the  pressure  is  not  yet  great  enough  to  force 
authorities to compromise. Some people have brought up that popular movement from 20 years ago, 
saying that the people’s refusal to compromise eventually led to bloodshed. But in actuality, on the 
subject of political reform, it must be the government that complies with the will of the people; the 
government must be more willing to enter into compromise.
…
In my opinion, through the influence of the past 30 years of reform and opening, especially the 
Internet enlightenment of the last 10 years, conditions in China have sufficiently matured enough to 
implement reforms. The time for direct elections of county heads, mayors, and provincial governors 
has arrived. Now we can say that “all is ready, all that lacks is a strong wind.” This strong wind is  
nothing other than the wisdom and responsibility of the ruling party. The choice is completely in the 
hands of China’s ruling party: will China see the rise of another political party like the Kuomintang 
to challenge CCP authority, or will we end up in a situation similar to Tunisia’s, with a president  
forced to step down from power?
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Blog 4: Open Letter to the National People’s Congress from the Organizers of the Chinese 
Jasmine Rallies
Anonymous
Posted on www.Buxonblog.com on 21th of February 2011 
Translated by Human Rights in China
First, we would like to thank every participant of the Jasmine Rallies. Your participation has already 
made the authoritarian government very nervous. Your presence has made the Chinese government 
understand that they must choose between these two paths:
The Chinese government will genuinely fight corruption and accept the supervision of the people.
Suppress popular protest, continue corruption, and continue to refuse the supervision of the people. 
Every Chinese person with dreams hopes that China will become prosperous, rich, and powerful, 
that the people will not have to worry about food and clothing, that the government is upright and 
honest, and that the judiciary is impartial and just. But twenty years have passed [since the 1989 
Democracy Movement], and what we are witnessing is a government that grows more corrupt by 
the  day,  government  officials  who  collude  with  vested  interests,  and  a  citizenry  that  has  not 
benefitted from the reform, opening up, and economic development. On the contrary, the people 
have to endure high goods and housing prices, and do not have health care, education, or benefits  
for the elderly. And what about ten years from now? Will we face a government even more corrupt? 
A judicial system even more opaque? Will vested interests give up their vested interest?
Every good and honest Chinese person, please think: So much public housing has been sold to 
individuals, so many state-owned enterprises and so much land have been sold, and nearly all state-
owned property has been sold off. But where has all the money from these sales gone? It goes 
without saying that state-owned property belongs to the entire people. But what did the people get? 
Led by an authoritarian regime, the opaque process of privatization has made a small number of 
people rich, but what did the vast number of ordinary people get?
Every good and honest Chinese person, please think: When Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were in the 
process  of  industrializing,  they  were  able  to  make  the  overwhelming  majority  of  their  people 
prosperous.  Why is  it  that  during  China’s  industrialization  the  ordinary  people  are  becoming 
poorer? Why is it that in just the last few decades China has gone from being a country with the  
smallest gap between the rich and the poor to one with the largest? It is because the unfair system 
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has made a small number of people incredibly wealthy, and the vast majority of people remain poor.
Every good and honest Chinese person, please think: Every year the government uses public money 
to eat and drink, buy cars, visit foreign places, and raise salaries for officials; yet it doesn’t have 
money to spend on health care, education, benefits for the elderly, or other basic needs. The vast 
majority of Chinese people do not have basic health care, education, or benefits for the elderly. Not 
to mention Europe,  America,  Japan, or Korea; our welfare system is far behind those of India, 
Russia, or Brazil. When other countries use the majority of their tax money for the welfare of their  
people, where does our tax money go?
Every good and honest Chinese person, please think: At present the renminbi ranks first among 
world currencies in terms of quantity in circulation. This serious “over-issuing” of currency has 
brought  about  a  vicious  cycle  of  inflation  inside  China.  The  excessive  printing  of  currency is 
recklessly diluting the value of the people’s wealth. Because the renminbi is not an international 
currency, it is China’s ordinary citizens who are out of luck. The meager income of China’s ordinary 
people must support goods and housing prices similar to those in Europe and America. On the one 
hand the government excessively prints money, and on the other hand it uses administrative means 
to keep housing prices low is this some sort of mockery?
Every good and honest Chinese person, please think: It is a matter of course that officials, when 
disclosing their wealth, should accept the supervision of the people, and that the government, when 
publishing  details  of  tax  revenues,  should  accept  the  supervision  of  the  people.  However,  the 
Chinese people have no such power. We have been waiting for decades. Even if we wait for another 
ten years, we will not be able to get this kind of power. Should we keep on waiting? Are you willing 
to wait another 10 years, 20 years, 30 years?
In short, without pressure from the people, absolutely no authoritarian government would take the 
initiative to respect the people or accept the people’s supervision. What we need to do now is to put 
pressure on the Chinese ruling party.  If the party does not conscientiously fight corruption and 
accept the supervision of the people, then will it please exit the stage of history. We call upon each 
Chinese person who has a dream for China to bravely come out to take an afternoon stroll at two 
o’clock on Sundays to look around. Each person who joins in will make it clear to the Chinese 
ruling party that if it does not fight corruption, if the government does not accept their supervision, 
the Chinese people will not have the patience to wait any longer.
Page 23
We do not necessarily have to overthrow the current government. As long as the government fights 
corruption, the government and officials accept the people’s supervision, the government is sincere 
about solving the problems regarding judicial independence and freedom of expression and gives a 
timetable, we can give the ruling party time to solve the problems. We can call a stop to the strolling 
activities.  We  have  been  waiting  for  decades,  if  the  government  is  sincere  about  solving  the 
problem, we do not mind waiting a little longer. However, if the government is not sincere about 
solving the problems, but only wants to censor the Internet and block information to suppress the 
protests,  the protests  will  only get  stronger.  As more and more people find out about  “jasmine 
rallies,” there will definitely be more and more Chinese people joining in.
We don’t care if we implement a one party system, a two party system, or even a three party system; 
but we are resolute in asking the government and the officials to accept the supervision of ordinary 
Chinese people, and we must have an independent judiciary. This is our fundamental demand.
We do not  support  violent  revolution;  we continue to  support  non-violent  non-cooperation.  We 
invite every participant to stroll, watch, or even just pretend to pass by. As long as you are present, 
the authoritarian government will be shaking with fear.
China belongs to every Chinese person, not to any political party. China’s future will be decided by 
every person. We ask that the government and officials accept the supervision of the people, that the 
details of tax collection be published, and that taxes are genuinely "collected from the people, and 
used for the people." These basic requests are not the least bit excessive. For our country’s future, 
for the fundamental rights of our children and future generations, please bravely come out. The 
Chinese people’s thirst for freedom and democracy is unstoppable (as Wen Jiabao said during an 
interview on CNN).
If you are unable to participate in the strolls, please tell every Chinese person near you: We need an 
upright and honest government. We need the right to supervise government tax collection. We need 
the right to scrutinize officials’ wealth. We need the right to publicly criticize the government. These 
are the fundamental rights of every Chinese person. Please tell every Chinese person near you: Non-
violent non-cooperation is the only path for Chinese democratization. Please use word-of-mouth to 
break through the news blackout and come show your support.
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The Chinese people rely on themselves to fight for their rights. We should not even dream that an 
authoritarian regime would take the initiative to award us these rights. Please join us in non-violent 
non-cooperation to make the Chinese government respect the basic rights of the Chinese people.
Time: Every Sunday starting on February 20, 2011 at 2 pm. (If the Chinese government is sincere 
about  solving  problems  such  as  corruption  and  public  supervision,  we  will  send  out  a  notice 
stopping the action.)
Rally Locations: 
 Beijing: in front of the McDonald’s on Wangfujing Street
 Shanghai: in front of Peace Cinema at People’s Square 
 Tianjin: below the Drum Tower 
 Nanjing,  [Jiangsu Province]:  the entrance of Silk  Street  Department  Store at  the Drum Tower 
Square
 Xi’an, [Shaanxi Province]: the entrance of Carrefour on Beida Street 
 Chengdu, [Sichuan Province]: under the Statue of Chairman Mao at Tianfu Square 
 Changsha, [Hunan Province]: the entrance of Xindaxin Building at Wuyi Square 
 Hangzhou, [Zhejiang Province]: the entrance of Hangzhou Department Store at Wulin Square
 Guangzhou, [Guangdong Province]: in front of the Starbucks at the People’s Park 
 Shenyang, [Liaoning Province]: in front of the KFC at North Nanjing Street 
 Changchun,  [Jilin  Province]:  in  front  of  Corogo  Supermarket  at  Democratic  Avenue  of  West 
Culture Square 
 Harbin, [Heilongjiang Province]: in front of Harbin Cinema
 Wuhan, [Hubei Province]: in front of the McDonald’s at Jiefang Avenue and the World Trade Plaza 
 People who are in cities not listed here, please go to the central square of your city.
We ask websites to help spread this statement, thank you!
One of the organizers of China Jasmine Rallies.
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Source 1: Democracy in China: Challenge or Opportunity? 
By Yu Keping 
Prof. & Director, China Center for Comparative Politics & Economics 
After the Cold War, scholars and politicians in both the East and West all believed, according to Francis 
Fukuyama, that Capitalism had won a final victory and history would end with a Western-style, liberal 
democratic system in every country. However, world history did not proceed as they expected. 
Perhaps it was unexpected, but Western-style liberal democratic structures did not blossom into full-
blown political systems in countries like the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, despite the 
breakdown of previous political systems. It is worth pointing out that the present political development 
in Russia has been significantly different from the so-called “liberal democracy” in the West and that 
even now some countries in Latin American and Asia, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, 
have also encountered many difficulties when attempting to promote liberal democratic reforms. 
China’s reforms, however, are evolving very rapidly. Her unique political development model is not only 
distinct from the traditional Soviet Union Socialist model, but also diverges from the Western liberal 
democratic style. The Chinese political model challenges the classic liberal democratic theory in 
Western literature and raises questions such as: Is democracy a common value for all humankind? Does 
a non-liberal form of democracy really exist? 
These concerns also attract the most heated debates about Chinese democratic reform within China 
itself since the founding of the nation in 1949. This political discourse in China is concentrated in 
questions like: What is the relationship between democracy and social modernization? Does western-
style democracy also apply in China? Is there a Chinese model of democracy? Is democracy an 
opportunity or a challenge for China? 
Next year will be the first centenary anniversary of establishing a democratic republic 2 and ending the 
feudal-autocracy rule in China. As a Chinese scholar, I want to express my syntheses and reflections of 
the democratic movement in China for the past 100 years, especially the last three decades of political 
development during the “reform and opening-up” period. I will also offer my answers to the above 
questions and concerns. 
Chinese democratic pioneer Dr. Sun Yat-Sen considered democracy as an inevitable step in the 
advancement of civilization. He preached to Chinese people: “This world trend is vast and mighty. To 
follow its suit shall prosper, whereas to oppose it shall perish.” 1As the founder of the Nationalist Party 
(or Kuomintang), he led the first democratic revolution in Chinese history, which overthrew the Qing 
Dynasty and the final Chinese emperor, establishing the original Republic of China (ROC). However, the 
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democratic revolution that Sun strove for ultimately did not succeed. 
1 Sun Yat-Sen: Essays on Democracy and Others (Sanmingzhuyi), see All Works of Sun Yat-Sen. Beijing: Zhong Hua Books Co., 1986. 
2 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy” (Xingmingzhuzhuyi Lun), Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Beijing: People’s Press, 1969, pp. 
662-711. 
Not long after the establishment of the ROC, China experienced a short period of restoration of the 
dethroned monarch, followed by a de facto dictatorship ruled by Sun’s Nationalist successors. They 
eventually lost support of the Chinese people and then were thrown out of the mainland by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In fact, the key reason that the CCP could defeat the Kuomintang 
during the last Civil War was because of democracy. The founding fathers and leaders of the CCP all 
stressed the importance of democracy, especially Chen Duxiu, who was one of the leaders of the 
famous democratic movement—“the May 4th Movement of 1919”—in modern Chinese history. 
Chairman Mao Zedong was also a feverish advocator of Chinese democratic politics. In his masterpiece 
“On New Democracy,” he systematically illustrated the CCP’s guiding principle on Chinese 
development. 2The CCP led by him founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, which was 
really a milestone in the history of Chinese democracy. Mao Zedong explicitly declared that only 
through democracy could a government survive from being overthrown and democracy could also 
bring about the Chinese national goal of “great rejuvenation”. 
After 1949, the CCP made tremendous exploration into promoting democracy in 3 China, which led to 
several outstanding achievements. Examples could be listed such as: abolishing feudalistic hierarchy 
and privilege, equalizing gender differences, and enabling poor workers and farmers to be involved in 
national administration. However, very soon after 1949, Chinese democracy regressed into a severely 
degraded situation. The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, also led by Mao Zedong, completely 
destroyed the normal democratic mechanism and legal progress and culminated in absolute autarchy. 
The reform and opening-up policy designed by Deng Xiaoping marked a new epoch in Chinese 
democracy. Undoubtedly, the reforms started in 1978 allowed the Chinese economy to boom at an 
extremely rapid speed, which created a miracle in modern world economic history. During the 30-year 
period from 1978 to 2008, Chinese GDP grew from 364.5 billion yuan (approximately 50.1 billion USD 
at 2010 exchange rate) to 30.067 trillion yuan (about 4.295 trillion USD). The average annual growth 
rate exceeded 9% and the GDP per capita also increased from 381 yuan (about 54.3 USD) to 22,600 
yuan (approx. 3,228.57 USD).3 The nation’s comprehensive strength also leapt forward to third place in 
the world. 
3 National Bureau of Statistics, “Statistics Report of 2009”. 
4 Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1993. 
But many Western scholars believed that China’s reform and opening-up policy only achieved great 
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success concerning economic modernization, with no significant progress in political democratization. 
Some even went so far as to claim the reason for the successful Chinese economic modernization was 
precisely because China did not have any accompanying democratic reforms.4 The example most often 
raised in this literature was the former Soviet Union, for which the pace of democratization reform 
exceeded the speed of economic modernization. These critical observations also overlooked the fact 
that Chinese reform and opening-up was dealing with more than a billion people. Unfamiliar changes 
to such a massive population, if too hasty or not carefully thought through, would cause 
unprecedented suffering to hundreds of millions, as well as negatively affect economies and trade 
partners both regionally and globally. 
Chinese modernization is an integrated, multi-level social change process, which includes not only 
enormous economic progress, but also tremendous political and cultural improvement. The political 
impetus to economic prosperity was actually 4 more significant in China’s reform than many Western 
countries. Mao Zedong, who deeply understood the Chinese social and historic traditions, clearly 
stated: “Politics is the commander, the soul, and the bloodline of all economic tasks.”5 If there were no 
political reform, China’s modernization would have never succeeded. This point is already proven by 
the historical and record-setting progress made during the Chinese reform and opening-up era. 
5 See Article Collections of Mao Zedong, edited by Central Office of Document, Beijing: People’s Press, 1996, p. 351. 
6 Deng Xiaoping, “Reform of the Leadership System of the Party and State”, Selections of Deng Xiaoping Volume II, Beijing: 
People’s Press, 1983, pp. 320-343. 
China’s reform and opening-up process was initiated from significant political reform 30 years ago. The 
Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP (hereinafter “the Third Plenary 
Session”) became the landmark for Chinese economic reform, which was actually also an historic 
venue of political reform by the CCP. The Third Plenary Session reorganized the CCP’s power structure 
and redirected the Party’s political principles and working emphases. Without this political reform, it 
would have been impossible to attain later achievement in economic structural change. Certain 
Western scholars use their democratic standards, such as a multi-party system, universal suffrage, and 
checks and balances, to evaluate Chinese political development in the reform era and conclude that 
Chinese reform is more economic than political. This is, of course, an unnecessary bias and 
misunderstanding, as I will further elaborate. 
Concurrent with the fundamental change of economic structure, the Chinese political system also 
experiences a profound reform. The impact of political system to economic development is much more 
powerful in China than that in the Western countries. Without political structural reform, there would 
be no economic systematic change. This is a basic experience gained during the Chinese reform era. 
Deng Xiaoping, the designer and leader of Chinese reform, deeply understood this point. He 
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articulated: “If we fail to do that [political reform], we shall be unable to preserve the gains we have 
made in the economic reform.” “Without political reform, economic reform cannot succeed … So in the 
final analysis, the success of all our other reforms depends on the success of the political reform.”6 As it 
turned out, the process of Chinese reform and opening-up is an integral and comprehensive process of 
social changes, including economic, political, and cultural dimensions in Chinese society. 5 Reform of 
political ideology is a crucial premise for political reform and democratic construction. Deng Xiaoping 
even considered the change of ideas as the fundamental premise for the entire Chinese reform effort. 
Thus, he identified “emancipating our minds” as the primary task for this reform movement. He further 
stated: “Our drive for the four modernizations will get nowhere unless rigid thinking is broken down 
and the minds of cadres and of the masses are completely emancipated.”7 To simplify it, emancipation 
of minds refers to breaking loose from the bondage of old-fashioned dogmas and out-dated ideas, to 
develop new ideas and new theories that keep pace with social advancement and the times, and to 
guide social practices using these new ideas. 
7 Deng Xiaoping, “Emancipating Our Minds, Seeking Truth from Facts and Uniting as One in Looking to the Future”, Selections of  
Deng Xiaoping Volume II, Beijing: People’s Press, 1983, p 143. 
8 For details on this point, please refer to Yu Keping, Emancipation of Mind and Political Progress. Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press, 2008. 
China’s reform over the past 30 years fully demonstrates that the change of ideas is closely related to 
socio-political development. In some sense, the process of Chinese reform is a consequence of clashes 
between ideas of old and new. It is a process of new ideas defeating old ones, which, in turn, promotes 
civil advancement and social well-being. From the macro-level perspective, since the beginning of 
reform and opening-up, the CCP’s largest theoretical innovation is the establishment of an ideological 
system of gradually building socialism with Chinese characteristics. This includes “Deng Xiaoping 
Theory”, important thoughts of “three represents,” and the “scientific outlook on development”. 
From the perspective of political theory, “emancipating of thoughts” not only means the new ideas are 
in lieu of old ones, it also directly and profoundly influences the Chinese socio-political life after the 
reform and vigorously propels Chinese democratic advancement. These new ideas include: people-
oriented government, human rights, private property, rule of law, civil society, harmonious society, 
government innovation, good governance, political civilization, and globalization. Most of these ideas 
are learned and borrowed from the Western developed countries, some of which had previously been 
criticized and even banned as the thoughts of the Capitalistic ideology prior to the reform era.8 
The revolutionary changes in China’s ideology and economic system also lead to a 6 great improvement 
of political development. In the past 60 years, the themes of Chinese politics have experienced 
tremendous alternations from revolution to reform, from struggle to harmony, from dictatorship to 
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democracy, from rule by people to rule of law, and from state to society. It is especially in the 30 years 
after the reform and opening-up that we can see Chinese political development gradually moves in the 
direction of democratization. The CCP changes its role from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. The 
functions of the CCP and the state government start to separate and the Party’s activities are restricted 
within the state legal system. A relatively independent civil society begins to evolve and gradually plays 
a more and more important role in decision-making processes. The principle of rule of law is formally 
established as an ultimate objective for CCP and the Chinese people to strive for. Comprehensive 
reform on legal system is also underway. Direct election as a basic political procedure is practiced in 
most rural villages. Human rights are formally protected by the country’s Constitution. 
However, Chinese political reform is largely a governance reform. The focus of the political reform is 
concentrated in ameliorating the state governance ability in the areas of creating a service-oriented 
government, improving the quality of public services, making decisions democratically and rationally, 
adopting public hearing systems, opening administrative procedures to public scrutiny, and promoting 
political transparency. 
So, if the aforementioned advancements in China’s political system are properly observed by foreign 
analysts, they would not come to such a conclusion that the political legitimacy of CCP and the Chinese 
government is only based on successful economic development and the accompanying improvements 
of people’s livelihood. It is also unwise to ignore or forget that mere “democratic” governance has little 
or nothing to do with political legitimization and gaining people’s trust. In addition, to consider China’s 
successful reform and opening-up story as the model of Asian “enlightened despotism” is departing 
from the truth. On the contrary, both positive and negative sides and both values and lessons from 
Chinese modernization and reform all indicate that economic progress or improvement of people’s 
livelihood by themselves can neither legalize a political regime, nor guarantee the public’s support for 
the government. 7 Our survey data also shows that the biggest challenges faced by the Chinese 
government nowadays—or put another way, the most unsatisfactory issues that concern the public 
about their government—lie not in economic growth, but in social problems such as social inequality, 
the growing gap between the rich and poor, serious corruption among public officials, social instability, 
high crime rates, environmental degradation, and ignorance of citizens’ human rights. To solve these 
problems, it is far from enough to merely rely on economic development: it is imperative to enhance 
democratic governance. This is the basic reason why Chinese President Hu Jintao stresses the 
importance of “scientific development.” The essence of “scientific development” lies in the 
coordinated, comprehensive, and sustainable development policies and practices among the political, 
economic, cultural, societal, and environmental arenas.9 This is also the reason that Premier Wen 
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Jiabao continually underscores that democracy and rule of law, as well as equality and justice, are the 
primary values of true Socialism. 10 
9 Hu Jintao, “Holding High the Flag of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Striving for the New Victory of Constructing an 
Overall Xiaokang Society”, Speech on the 17th Party Congress of CCP. 
10 Wen Jiabo, “Government Work Report to the Fifth Plenary Session of 10th National People’s Congress”, March 5, 2007. 
Nevertheless, we must admit that the Chinese way of political development—especially the political 
democratization—is extremely different from the Western democratic tradition. Differences are 
natural, and not automatically antagonistic, given the different contexts and cultures from which 
Eastern and Western civilizations have arisen. Consequently, it is almost dead-end to explain the 
Chinese way of democratic politics through using existing Western democratic theories. Likewise, from 
the standards of Western democratic political values, it is hard to recognize that the Chinese political 
system is heading for democracy. Based on the Western theory of democracy, a multiparty system, 
universal suffrage, and the separation of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers are normally 
considered as the major standards for a democratic polity. Missing any one of these standards, a 
political system cannot be labeled as a “democracy.” According to such standards, China obviously 
neither belongs to the “democratic camp,” nor is a member of the “world democratic league.” 
In its original meaning, democracy means “government by the people”. Thus, the fundamental criteria 
to judge whether one country is a “democracy” or not is government’s responsiveness to its citizens 
rather the aforementioned three 8 standards frequently waved by western scholars. In this sense, 
“democracy” is a continuum rather than a dichotomy. As long as one country has formal institutions to 
guarantee that government policies can effectively reflect the public’s opinions, that citizens can 
participate in political life, and the incumbent political regime has to response to people’s interests, it 
can all be considered as democratic systems regardless of the particular party systems, election 
procedures, or power separation mechanisms. Therefore, Chinese leaders and mainstream scholars 
insist that China does not necessarily need to imitate or copy a Western democratic system, but we can 
and should create a democratic model with Chinese characteristics and therefore practice democracy 
which is suited to our culture and people’s needs. 
What does Chinese-style democracy exactly mean? The CCP proposes four types of democracy in 
China: democratic election, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and democratic 
supervision. But as far as democratic elections go, Chinese government seems to concentrate more on 
political deliberation. Thus, some scholars consider the Chinese way of democracy as “deliberative 
democracy”. China insists on practicing the CCP’s dominant rule and not necessarily a multiparty 
system or parliamentary politics. However, Chinese polity is not simply a single party politics, but the 
political system of “multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CCP.” 
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China also does not implement a complete “checks and balances” to separate legislative, executive, 
and judicial bodies, but there is a relative independence among legislation, administration, and 
judiciary branches, which are divided into three separate systems. 
Ideologically, Marxism doctrines still take chief position in the domain of political thinking in China, but 
other ideological genres can also survive in the Chinese society, all of which form a unique picture of 
coexistence between unitary political ideology and pluralistic social thoughts. As for the relationship 
between the military and politics, China always maintains a civilian government that controls the 
military. Military powers are excluded from influencing politics and the CCP firmly controls the armed 
forces. For the relationship between the state and the society, a relatively independent civil society is 
evolving and it will continue to become more embedded in people’s lives. However, similar to the 
government-led market economy in China, Chinese civil society is also government-led and most of 
them do not possess an independent status such as their Western counterparts enjoy. 9 Since the 
publication of my paper “Democracy is a Good Thing,” a heated debate about democracy took place 
among Chinese political theorists. The main themes of the debate include: Is democracy a “universal 
value”? Does democracy have common features? What are the relations between the universality and 
the uniqueness of democracy? I have frequently addressed these issues in papers and interviews by 
emphasizing that democratic politics is a universal value among human beings and has common 
features. However, because the realization of democracy needs certain economic, political, and cultural 
conditions and these conditions vary significantly across countries and time, democracy in different 
countries normally contains unique and respective features. 
A democratic system is a marriage of universality and particularity. We cannot make arbitrary 
conclusions that democracy has only one model merely based on the assumption that democracy is a 
universal value and has common features. That is to say, we cannot deny the specialty of democracy 
simply with its universal features. On the other hand, we cannot exaggerate the particularity of 
democracy and totally ignore the existence of a universality of democracy only based on the evidence 
of diversified political and economic conditions in different countries. Therefore, we cannot deny the 
universality of democracy simply with its special features and consider that Chinese democracy has no 
similarities compared to other countries. The democracy that Chinese people are striving for also 
features public elections, power supervision, and citizens’ participation. But the election, supervision, 
and participation systems will have to be branded with unique Chinese characteristics. 
The nature of democracy is government by the people or “people become their own masters”, which is 
reflected in a series of institutions and mechanisms that guarantee the citizens’ democratic rights. No 
matter which party system, checks and balance of power system, and election system a certain country 
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adopts, as long as it can preserve the value of government of, by and for the people, it should be 
treated as a democratic system. The key here is whether people are really their “own masters;” in what 
degree do they “master;” and whether government behaviors and activities reflect people’s will and 
represent people’s basic interests. These should be the fundamental criteria to evaluate democratic 
politics and its development progress. 10 To conclude, from the past experiences of Chinese political 
development, I believe it is China’s urgent need to not only review its traditional Socialist democratic 
theories, but also to rethink the popular Western democratic theories. The Chinese development 
model is not fixed yet and still facing many challenges. Therefore, I dare not say China’s democratic 
model is completely mature or successful. But at least, I can claim that this model is distinctive from 
the traditional Soviet model as well as contemporary Western representative democracy. It is not only 
an outcome, but also a part of Chinese modernization. It basically fits into the process of 
modernization within Chinese society and is the endeavor of the Chinese people to maintain social 
stability, protect citizens’ basic human rights, and promote China’s belief in good governance. To China, 
democracy is a challenge, as well as an opportunity. But the opportunity far outweighs the challenge. 
Chinese democracy, growing out of Chinese tradition and society, will not only bring good fortune to 
the Chinese people, but also contribute greatly to the advancement of democratic theory and practice 
for all mankind. 11 
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Source 2:
United Nations S/2012/77
Security Council Distr.: General
4 February 2012
Original: English
12-22375 (E) 060212
*1222375*
Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo,
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:
draft resolution
The Security Council,
Recalling its presidential statement of 3 August 2011,
Recalling General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/176 of 19 December 2011,
as well as Human Rights Council resolutions S/16-1, S/17-1 and S/18-1,
Noting the League of Arab States’ request in its decision of 22 January 2012,
Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in Syria, and
profound concern at the death of thousands of people and calling for an immediate
end to all violence,
Welcoming the League of Arab States’ Action Plan of 2 November 2011 and its
subsequent decisions, including its decision of 22 January 2012, which aims to
achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis,
Noting the deployment of the League of Arab States’ observer mission,
commending its efforts, regretting that, due to the escalation in violence, the
observer mission was not in a position to monitor the full implementation of the
League of Arab States’ Action Plan of 2 November 2011, and noting the subsequent
decision of the League of Arab states to suspend the mission,
Underscoring the importance of ensuring the voluntary return of refugees and
internally displaced persons to their homes in safety and with dignity,
Mindful that stability in Syria is key to peace and stability in the region,
Noting the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform, and
regretting the lack of progress in implementation,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and
territorial integrity of Syria, emphasizing its intention to resolve the current political
crisis in Syria peacefully, and noting that nothing in this resolution authorizes
measures under Article 42 of the Charter,
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Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and all diplomatic efforts
aimed at addressing the situation, and noting in this regard the offer of the Russian
Federation to host a meeting in Moscow, in consultation with the League of Arab
States,
1. Condemns the continued widespread and gross violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force against
civilians, arbitrary executions, killing and persecution of protestors and members of
the media, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with access to
medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, including against
children;
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2. Demands that the Syrian government immediately put an end to all
human rights violations and attacks against those exercising their rights to freedom
of expression, peaceful assembly and association, protect its population, fully
comply with its obligations under applicable international law and fully implement
Human Rights Council resolutions S-16/1, S-17/1, S-18/1 and General Assembly
resolution A/RES/66/176;
3. Condemns all violence, irrespective of where it comes from, and in this
regard demands that all parties in Syria, including armed groups, immediately stop
all violence or reprisals, including attacks against State institutions, in accordance
with the League of Arab States’ initiative;
4. Recalls that all those responsible for human rights violations, including
acts of violence, must be held accountable;
5. Demands that the Syrian government, in accordance with the Plan of
Action of the League of Arab States of 2 November 2011 and its decision of
22 January 2012, without delay:
(a) cease all violence and protect its population;
(b) release all persons detained arbitrarily due to the recent incidents;
(c) withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns, and
return them to their original home barracks;
(d) guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations;
(e) allow full and unhindered access and movement for all relevant League
of Arab States’ institutions and Arab and international media in all parts of Syria to
determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents
taking place; and
(f) allow full and unhindered access to the League of Arab States’ observer
mission;
6. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an
environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at
effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people,
without prejudging the outcome;
7. Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ 22 January 2012
decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political
system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or
beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the
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Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the
League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the
League of Arab States;
8. Encourages the League of Arab States to continue its efforts in
cooperation with all Syrian stakeholders;
9. Calls upon the Syrian authorities, in the event of a resumption of the
observer mission, to cooperate fully with the League of Arab States’ observer
mission, in accordance with the League of Arabs States’ Protocol of 19 December
2011, including through granting full and unhindered access and freedom of
movement to the observers, facilitating the entry of technical equipment necessary
for the mission, guaranteeing the mission’s right to interview, freely or in private,
any individual and guaranteeing also not to punish, harass, or retaliate against, any
person who has cooperated with the mission;
10. Stresses the need for all to provide all necessary assistance to the mission
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in accordance with the League of Arab States’ Protocol of 19 December 2011 and its
decision of 22 January 2012;
11. Demands that the Syrian authorities cooperate fully with the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights and with the Commission of Inquiry
dispatched by the Human Rights Council, including by granting it full and
unimpeded access to the country;
12. Calls upon the Syrian authorities to allow safe and unhindered access for
humanitarian assistance in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to
persons in need of assistance;
13. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s efforts to provide support to the
League of Arab States, including its observer mission, in promoting a peaceful
solution to the Syrian crisis;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this
resolution, in consultation with the League of Arab States, within 21 days after its
adoption and to report every 30 days thereafter;
15. Decides to review implementation of this resolution within 21 days and,
in the event of non-compliance, to consider further measures;
16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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